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Executives in United States companies have always been compensated well for their 
services. This trend continues as executives’ pay increases every year. Publicly traded 
companies must file a statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission every year 
disclosing the amount and type of compensation plans for their executives. The goals and 
measures used to determine the amount and type for their compensation is not required to be 
determined using the same numbers that are audited in the financial statements. Companies 
can award top executives based on earnings and goals that the company did not actually 
achieve by making unaudited earnings per share (EPS) adjustments. These adjustments are 
often disclosed in the annual proxy statements, however, they are usually difficult and 
confusing to understand. Shareholders, investors, financial analysts, and the public depend on 
companies having their financial statements audited and their earnings being presented fairly. 
Using unaudited earnings per share to determine if and how much an executive should be 
compensated for their services each year is a misleading and unethical practice being used 
increasingly more in the United States by publicly held companies. 
Literature Review 
There has been extensive research on various aspects of executive compensation. This 
has included studies on why executives are given compensation packages as well as what these 
packages should include in regards to cash, equity, or other forms. Stock options are becoming 
the preferred compensation for high income owners. The increasing gap between executives 
and their employees’ pay has also been addressed by the financial industry. Additionally, the 
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disclosure of compensation plans to shareholders and the shareholders’ right to vote on the 
approval of compensation plans for their executives has been extensively studied.  
Most executive compensation packages include base salary, cash bonuses, stock 
bonuses, stock options, a non-equity incentive plan, pension, and others. These packages for 
executives are put together by the board of directors and managers and must be approved by 
shareholders. Shareholders did not always have the right to vote to approve or deny a plan. 
After many protests and studies were done in the financial industry, and in response to the 
Recession of 2008, The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was 
signed into federal law by President Obama in 2010. The law requires that shareholders vote 
and approve executive compensation plans for publicly traded companies (SEC). Shareholders, 
therefore, play a more active role in the compensation plan approval process and have a direct 
say in whether or not an executive receives the compensation plan created by the board of 
directors.  
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act was intended to give shareholders a voice in the 
process, to decrease shareholders’ disapproval of executive compensation plans, and to 
decrease the extreme amounts that some executives receive in bonuses. For example, Target’s 
Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO) compensation decreased from $20 million to $13 million in 
response to shareholders’ complaints that he made too much money relative to the company’s 
performance (Harris). However, this is not the case in many corporations as the votes are non-
binding, and the law has not had quite the effect that was expected. In 2013, “a full 72 percent 
of companies reporting votes have received 90 percent or more shareholder approval for their 
pay packages. That compares with 69 percent in both 2012 and 2011” (Eisinger B5). 
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Additionally, “98% of companies pass their say-on-pay votes in any given year” (Chasan). These 
approvals may not be the approvals that the law was hoping to require as shown by the 2014 
Coca-Cola say-on-pay vote. Coca-Cola claimed in 2014 that its’ executive compensation had 
been approved by shareholders by an 83% approval vote. However, Coke only counted the 
shareholders who actually voted and three of the top six largest shareholders did not support 
the compensation plan and withheld from voting. If Coke were to count all shareholders in 
computing the vote, only 49% of the shareholders would have been calculated as approving the 
compensation plan (Sorkin). Shareholders gaining the vote on compensation packages is not 
decreasing the amounts that executives are being paid; the amounts executives are being paid 
through compensation plans are continuing to increase each year.  
Currently, the executive compensation plans and the various parts that make up a plan 
are displayed in a table in companies’ proxy statements to be read by current and future 
investors. The disclosure of the arrangement of compensation plans was not always required. 
However, it was argued that shareholders did not have all of the information that they ethically 
should about the company they chose to invest in. The disclosure of compensation amount and 
structure including stock options and severance is now required by law to be filed with the SEC 
in companies’ proxy statements, which are available to shareholders as well as to the public 
following the passing of the SEC Act of 1934 and subsequent amendments. Under this law, 
companies are subject to Regulation S-K. This regulation requires, “clear, concise, 
understandable disclosure of all plan and non-plan compensation awarded to, earned by, or 
paid to the named executive officers…including disclosures of salary, bonuses, pension 
contributions, the fair value of stock, and option awards as well as the fair value of corporate 
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benefits provided by the firm to the executive” (Bertomeu 474). The requirement of the 
disclosures of all executives’ compensation should increase awareness and understanding of 
compensation plans by shareholders, investors, financial analysts, and the public.  
Additionally, shareholders fought to earn the right to vote on compensation plans. The 
shareholders can now use the disclosed information to make informed decisions when voting 
for the board of directors, on the approval of compensation plans, and on other aspects of the 
business. This was heavily supported by Michael Oxley, co-author of the Sarbanes-Oxley law 
that helped overhaul corporate governance for U.S. public companies. Oxley had even 
predicted that, “massive intervention by the government was possible if boards failed to do a 
better job of reining in compensation” and that “time is running out to see some courage and 
some leadership by boards of directors, if that doesn’t happen, somebody is going to do it 
[reform compensation] for them” (“The Ethics of Corporate Compensation”). The government 
had to pass a law to get companies to allow their shareholders to view, understand, vote, and 
approve the compensation plans created by the board of directors. However, this does not 
guarantee that shareholders fully understand the calculations used to create compensation 
plans or that the calculations are standardized or audited.  Executive compensation alone is 
complex enough to generally take up about 30 pages of a company’s proxy statement. This 
allows for companies to change the values used to compute compensation plans without using 
ethical decision making and without suffering any penalties for exercising unethical accounting 
practices. The unethical practices being used include giving executives big bonuses and 
compensation overall that they do not deserve based on the companies audited earnings, and 
not disclosing the use of non-audited financial measures that are not accepted or standardized 
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by GAAP in creating, calculating, adjusting, and publishing their executive compensation plans. 
Shareholders are often unaware that these practices are being used or how to interpret the 
proxy statement where they are disclosed. 
The compensation a company offers to an executive is influential in a person’s choice to 
pursue a high level position in that company. A company must offer competitive compensation 
packages in order to attract and retain essential executives.  Recently, most compensation 
plans are calculated on a case by case basis (Landsberg 19). This means that two people in the 
same position, level, and company would not necessarily receive the same bonus package. This 
can be beneficial to the executive based on what the executive prefers such as a plan tailoring 
to retirement savings, income, or equity. Compensation pay must also relate to the 
accomplishment of a company’s goals, company mission, and vision. Corporate performance 
goals are often driven by financial earnings or return. Therefore, compensation is used to 
influence future behavior to strive for good financial performance by the company (Landsberg 
19-20). 
Compensation plans are determined by the board of directors and are laid out in the 
company’s required SEC filing proxy statement. They are often computed based on the 
company’s yearly earnings relative to their predetermined goals. The board of directors have 
the ability to define these goals and measures of performance however they wish, thus directly 
influencing the payment of their top executives. 
Compensation packages for executives are shifting towards a greater inclusion of long-
term incentives. Long-term incentives are more desirable because they can create a bigger 
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return than short-term incentives. This includes cash performance rewards as well as restricted 
stock. This type of restricted stock does not reach full value for a specified period of time, 
creating time for stock prices to increase therefore increasing the compensation received. By 
tying the performance to compensation using stock options, CEOs should have motivation to 
strive to maximize stock prices to receive this pay for performance (Cormany). Stock options 
and shares were 63% of total compensation in 2013. The motivation to maximize stock prices 
should align CEO’s incentives more closely with those of the shareholders and benefit the 
shareholders. In Coca-Cola, however, these stock options were only available to 5% of the 
company’s work force (Sorkin). 
Compensation plans are determined by the board of directors and are laid out in the 
company’s required SEC filing Proxy Statement. They are often computed based on the 
company’s yearly earnings relative to their predetermined goals. The board of directors have 
the ability to define these goals and measures of performance however they wish, thus directly 
influencing the payment of their top executives. 
If compensation is tied to performance, it can be tax deductible. The Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) definition for performance states that performance can be defined by the 
company as it chooses as determined by a compensation committee of the board of directors 
(26 U.S. Code § 162 - Trade or Business Expenses). For example, in 2012, “Exelon Corp. awarded 
more than $20 million in cash bonuses to top managers as tax deductible “performance-based 
pay”” (Smith). Because the performance targets are set by each company individually, 
companies’ directors can deliberately set targets low so that they are always met in order to get 
paid. On average, “management’s bonus goals were 2.6 cents a share easier to achieve than 
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market analysts’ estimates” (Smith). While setting low annual performance goals is present in 
many corporations, this is not always the case. For example, among the 100 largest companies 
that had filed proxies by April 4, 2014, 26 CEOs had been given a pay cut. Among them was 
Coca-Cola CEO Muhtar Kent who took a 16% cut (Sorkin). Mr. Kent still received the large sum 
of $20,380,660 in total compensation in 2013.  
A deduction is available for the first $1,000,000 salary paid to the CEO and next 4 
highest employees of a company (26 U.S. Code § 162 - Trade or Business Expenses). 
Theoretically, this should contain executive pay. However, top executives are still being paid 
large sums. According to the 2013 Equilar 100 C.E.O. Pay Study, the “median compensation of a 
chief executive in 2013 was $13.9 million” (Morgenson). Stock options are attractive due to tax 
benefits. High income taxpayers’ incomes are taxed at higher rates. However, stock options are 
taxed as long-term capital gains, which are taxed at a lower level (Cormany). This is beneficial 
because the taxpayer will be able pay less taxes on the stock options than if the compensation 
received from the stock options was classified as regular income. One of the problems that this 
causes in the United States is that according to the congressional Joint Committee on Taxation, 
tax advantaged bonuses awards, those meeting the $1,000,000 salary cap or performance 
based compensation requirement for tax deductions, by corporations “cost the U.S. Treasury 
$3.5 billion a year”  (Smith).  This number will continue to grow as more companies take 
advantage of these tax benefits.  
In 2013 the United States House and Senate introduced legislation that would make all 
executive compensation subject to the $1,000,000 cap for deductibility, eliminating the 
exception for performance pay. In 2014, with the passing of the Affordable Care Act, “any 
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health insurance executive pay above $500,000 is non-deductible” (Anderson). The Joint 
Committee on Taxation estimates that if this was applied across the board it would generate 
$50 billion over 10 years. In addition to generating more tax funds, the passing of more 
restrictive legislation would encourage companies to reconsider giving such large bonuses to 
top executives instead of to other employees or shareholders.  
It has also been argued that the amount and structure of compensation affects an 
organization in regards to company culture and loyalty. Since 1979, “the disparity between the 
pay of executives and their employees has grown from thirty-five times average salary to more 
than 270 times average salary, and total packages have reached as high as $131 million per 
year” (Cormany). In 2014 Harvard Business School conducted a study that concluded that 
“Americans believe CEOs make 30 times as much as unskilled workers, Americans believe that 
CEOs should only make 7 times as much as unskilled workers, and that in reality, CEOs made 
354 times as much in 2012” (Vollmer). Executives are being paid much higher amounts 
compared to their employees. This gap in compensation between executives and employees 
can possibly create many hostile employees in the workplace towards their executives, board 
members, and the company as a whole. Employees are not being compensated as well as their 
executives in response to the company’s success and the gap continues to increase every year. 
Some companies even choose to continue these compensation plans when their financial 
statements show that their company had an unsuccessful year and is losing money. 
In 2008, there were even hearings held by the government regarding the practice of 
executives’ compensation being increased when the company had lost money and had an 
unsuccessful year being done by major companies in the United States. Countrywide 
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(purchased by Bank of America in 2008) lost $1.6 billion in 2007 and its stock lost 80% of its 
value. Merrill Lynch lost $10 billion and its stock lost 45% of its value. Citigroup also lost $10 
billion and its stock lost 48% of its value.  Despite enormous company losses, the CEOs were still 
paid substantial amounts in bonuses ("U.S. House Committee Holds Hearing on CEO Pay"). This 
might indicate that some executives would rather have a high paycheck and bonus than see 
their business be successful. If executives are forced to step down from their positions due to 
poor company performance, they are still paid a great amount of money and essentially go 
unpunished financially.   
Companies that are awarding their executives financial rewards through compensation 
packages are often engaging in unethical business and accounting practices by awarding large 
amounts using non-audited earnings to determine the type and amount of compensation. They 
are being greatly rewarded even if their company’s stock is decreasing in value and the 
company is not showing growth and is suffering from losses. They are rewarded at the expense 
of the shareholders who do not fully understand the calculations made when creating 
compensation plans. Compensation plans can be created using non-audited earnings and by 
changing earnings calculations in order to meet predetermined goals because compensation 
plans are not regulated and audited like the financial statements. Executives can be given 
compensation that does not accurately reflect the company’s actual earnings or financial 
position, therefore, participating in unethical accounting practices. 
There has been debate recently on how executives’ compensations are computed 
because the earnings used to compute these profits are not required to be audited or conform 
to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). There is speculation that companies make 
10 
 
unannounced adjustments to their GAAP accepted earnings, specifically earnings per share, in 
order to meet performance goals or expectations. Only by reading the proxy statement does a 
shareholder learn of the adjustments. Because the proxy statement is not regulated by GAAP, 
this is legally allowed though not necessarily ethical. This can be a misleading calculation to 
investors or potential investors that receive or consider proxy statements who believe that the 
compensation plans are based on the earnings listed on the audited financial statements. 
Companies are required to disclose “factors considered in decisions to increase or decrease 
compensation materially [and] no quantitative assessment of contingent performance payoff is 
required” (Bertomeu, 474). This means that companies are not required to disclose their target 
levels specific to any quantitative or qualitative performance-related factors considered when 
calculating the compensation. This can lead to unethical decisions made by many companies. 
Some companies choose voluntarily to disclose additional information in the proxy statement 
such as specific weights used. 
Many companies that have an increase in earnings per share from the previous year do 
not use the GAAP audited earnings per share when giving their CEOs and other executives pay 
raises. The Wall Street Journal reported that based on disclosures in proxy statements by 
companies that have at least $700 million in stock that isn’t in control of the company, 542 
companies in 2013 used earnings that did not follow GAAP to determine executive pay 
(Rapoport). Using adjusted earnings per share that do not follow GAAP can have significant 
impact on the amount that is ultimately awarded to CEOs.  
Additionally, tax deductions could be a contributing factor to the practice of 
unregulated earnings used in computations of executive compensations. If bonus payments 
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result from the achievement of performance goals they are deductible under the Revenue 
Reconciliation Act of 1993. This is an incentive for companies to compute their bonuses based 
on unaudited earnings and achievable goals rather than on the earnings presented on the 
audited GAAP financial statements. This is unethical because it does not truly reflect how well a 
company did or did not do that year.  This practice is misleading in the long-term to the 
company’s employees, investors, and to the general public.  
Method 
To investigate the ethics behind compensation plan calculations, to determine if 
unaudited measures are being used in publicly traded companies, and how often unaudited 
measures are being used I considered twenty-six companies from a variety of industries. These 
included technology, agriculture, retail, finance and insurance, health care, natural resources, 
and others. Industry leading companies were selected to be studied as well as some of personal 
interest. Companies that have been speculated by financial analysts, recent published articles, 
or studies as companies that have unethical compensation plans and have used unethical 
accounting practices in determining executive compensation were also considered. These 
companies are similar in that they all must meet the same standards in order to be traded 
publicly. 
Upon selecting the companies to study, I began to gather data on them. I mainly looked 
at the companies’ financial statements and proxy statements. All publicly traded companies are 
required by law to file the proxy statements with the SEC every year, so they are available to 
the public. Within the proxy statement, “a company must disclose information concerning the 
amount and type of compensation paid to its chief executive officer, chief financial officer and 
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the three other most highly compensated executive officers” (SEC).  Therefore, I looked at the 
proxy statements to learn the amounts and other financial data about companies’ executive 
compensation plans.  For each company I recorded the CEOs total compensation for the past 
three years as well as the amounts of the salary, bonus, stock, stock options, non-equity 
incentive plan, pension, and other for the current year. This data is shown in Table 1 in the 
Appendix. I also studied how the various parts of these plans are computed. 
In order to further gain an understanding of a company’s executive compensation plans, 
I studied other aspects of the plans that were disclosed. By law, companies are also required to 
disclose, “The criteria used in reaching executive compensation decisions and the degree of the 
relationship between the company's executive compensation practices and corporate 
performance” (SEC). This information is shown in various tables and descriptions in the proxy 
statement. I studied these tables and descriptions in order to improve my knowledge of the 
many ways that companies evaluate and distribute compensation to executives and to evaluate 
the ethics of these compensation plans.  
Results 
Of the twenty-six companies that I researched, nine of them had a decrease in earnings 
per share shown on their annual reports from 2012 to 2013. Apple’s EPS decreased by $4.61, 
however, the CEO received an increase in total compensation of $77, 735 or 2%. This was 
comprised of salary, stock options, and other. The other eight companies showing a decrease in 
earnings per share in 2013 also decreased their CEO’s compensation by an average of 35% from 
2012. For example, Casey’s notes in their proxy statement that the range in EPS to result in 
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bonus was $3.10-$3.32. Actual EPS was well below this range and decreased from the previous 
year. As a result, no awards were earned under the annual incentive plan for the 2013 fiscal 
year. Casey’s CEO’s total compensation decreased by 49%. Table 2 and Chart 1 in the Appendix 
compares the companies that had a decrease in earnings per share and their CEO’s increase 
(decrease) in total compensation. This data shows that based on the sample, companies’ 
compensation committees are responding to a decrease in earnings per share.  
Of the twenty-six companies sampled, twelve companies admitted to shareholders in 
their proxy statements to using an adjusted earnings per share for determining CEO and 
executives’ compensation.  Many of these adjustments had positive results for the CEOs. The 
companies in the sample that disclosed a non-GAAP earnings per share adjustment in their 
respective proxy statement are shown in Table 3 in the Appendix. The table compares 
companies’ GAAP earnings per share to the CEO total compensation.  For example, in 2013 
Cisco had a 25% increase in GAAP earnings per share and adjusted the earnings per share to 
result in an 80% or $9,361,835 increase in total CEO compensation. Exelon had a 41% increase 
in GAAP earnings per share in 2013 that was adjusted by an increase of $0.50 a share to result 
in a 69% or $6,990,448 increase for the CEO’s total compensation. Johnson & Johnson’s CEO 
received a 54% or $5,933,851 increase in total compensation, however, the unadjusted GAAP 
earnings per share only increased by 25%. Proctor & Gamble had only a 5% increase in GAAP 
earnings per share, but the CEO received an 18% or $2,766,073 increase in total compensation. 
These examples show that when earnings increase, CEOs’ total compensations also increase but 
by a substantially bigger amount. 
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Figure 1: Exelon Adjusted Operating Earnings Per Share 
 
While some companies disclose the way that they adjusted their GAAP earnings per 
share in the proxy statement, some simply give a description of the adjustments without 
providing any numerical data. JP Morgan Chase shows a calculation of a $1.35 adjustment, 
Walgreens shows a calculation of a $0.56 adjustment, and Exelon shows a calculation of a $0.50 
adjustment. Exelon’s calculation as shown in the 2014 Proxy Statement: 
  
Other companies use a variety of methods to adjust earnings per share such as excluding stock 
payments to employees, stripping out goodwill write-downs, or excluding expenses related to 
acquisitions but still counting the earnings generated by acquisitions (Rapoport). Cisco’s proxy 
statement does not give a calculation or numerical data of the non-GAAP earnings per share 
adjustment, but provides a description of the adjustment:  
Share-based compensation expense; compensation expense related to acquisitions and 
investments; changes in estimates of contingent consideration related to acquisitions 
and investments; amortization or impairment of acquired intangible assets including in-
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process research and development; impacts to cost of sales from purchase accounting 
adjustments to inventory; all external acquisition-related costs such as finder’s fees, 
advisory, legal, accounting, valuation, hedging or other professional or consulting fees 
directly associated with acquisitions and investments; and each of the following subject 
to pre-established thresholds; the impact of any cumulative effect of changing to newly 
adopted accounting principles; operating income of the acquired entity and its 
subsidiaries as reflected on the financial records thereof; losses due to impairments or 
loss contingencies; direct losses on Cisco’s tangible assets from natural catastrophe, 
war, insurrection, riot, terrorism, confiscation, expropriation, nationalization, 
deprivation, or seizure; and restructuring charges (Cisco). 
This shows how companies will go to great lengths to use and justify non-GAAP, unaudited 
adjustments made to earnings per share that are used to determine executive compensation. 
This is evident whether they choose to disclose the adjustments through a table with 
calculations or a description of the adjustments made. Some companies even use these non-
GAAP adjusted measures as the profit targets they must hit in order for executives to receive 
incentives.  
 Executive compensation continues to be awarded in high amounts whether or not the 
company’s actual performance was high. As shown in Table 4 in the Appendix, in the sample 
taken of 26 companies for the year ended 2013, the average CEO total compensation was 
$18,251,421 and the highest total compensation was $78,440,657 awarded to the CEO at 
Oracle. The lowest total compensation was an honorary $1 awarded to the CEO of Google 
although he still owns a stake in the company worth billions. The next lowest total 
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compensation was $1,195,591 awarded to the CEO of Casey’s. The data also shows that on 
average, the highest portion of total compensation is stock which makes up 55% of the average 
total compensation. Chart 2 in the Appendix displays the various parts of compensation 
packages and what percentage each part is of the average total compensation of the sampled 
companies. 
 The SEC requires that publicly traded companies disclose the amount and type of their 
compensation plans that reward their executives.  It does not, however, have the jurisdiction to 
require a standard structure for the amount and type of compensation that a company grants, 
or standardize how it is calculated.  
Because companies are not required to give their executives’ compensation based on 
any standard, they can administer bonuses however they wish. Companies have to make a 
business decision on how they will reward their executives. Nevertheless, just because they are 
making a wise business decision does not mean that it is an ethical decision. Many of the 
companies researched did not make these decisions ethically and instead shaped their goals 
and performance measures so that they would comfortably meet these goals and measures in 
order for the executives to receive large compensation. For example, 93% of Walt Disney’s 
CEO’s compensation was based on performance (Eavis). He collected “a fully deductible $16.5 
million cash bonus, 38 percent above the goal, according to the 2013 proxy statement”. This 
was based “predominantly on an evaluation of four financial measures including an adjusted 
earnings per share range with a midpoint of 4.1 percent below the consensus estimate and 9.4 
percent below the earnings result” (Smith).  This example shows how performance measures 
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can be manipulated in order for the company to meet its’ goals and the executives can receive 
a larger bonus.  
Conclusion 
Executives are being paid high amounts based on unaudited financial goals and 
measures. While companies are required by the SEC to disclose the amount and type of 
compensation plans used each year in the proxy statement, they are not required to disclose 
how it is calculated. Companies are adjusting their GAAP compliant earnings from the financial 
statements so that goals are easily achieved and large executive compensations can be 
rationalized. These adjustments are not required to be disclosed although many companies do 
share them. However, even if the unaudited adjustments are shown in the proxy statement, 
this does not guarantee that shareholders know or understand that they are being used. 
Shareholders, investors, financial analysts, and the public rely on financial earnings that are 
audited in compliance with GAAP, not on confusingly presented disclosures buried deep in a 
lengthy proxy statement. 
The analysis of the structure and calculation of compensation plans is significantly 
beneficial in the financial industry. It encourages the public to consider if the calculations used 
in creating executive compensation plans are ethical and if they agree with the board of 
directors and executives on how these plans are created and computed. Shareholders are 
encouraged to consider this analysis when voting to approve compensation plans. Companies 
are encouraged to use ethical accounting practices and make ethical decisions using audited 
financial measures including earnings when computing compensations to top executives and 
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disclosing executive compensation information in their annual proxy statement. “The definition 
and purpose for each adjustment should be explained and the corresponding item in the 
financial statements should be identified, located and quantified. When an adjustment is not a 
GAAP measure, the basis for its computation should be explained” (IFAC 10). Companies should 
disclose more information of adjustments being made and make a greater effort to make these 
disclosures easier to read and be understood by the average shareholder. This would allow for 
shareholders to make more informed decisions when voting on compensation plans at the 
annual meetings. Awareness should also be increased of non-audited measures being used for 
executive compensation plans by financial analysts, scholarly journals, and other well-read 
publications such as the Wall Street Journal. Companies should attempt to avoid using the 
unethical accounting practice of using non-audited financial measures that are not accepted or 
standardized by GAAP in creating, calculating, adjusting, and publishing their executive 
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plan Pension Other 
Amazon 1.39 -0.09 0.6 1,681,840 1,681,840 1,681,840 81,840 - - - - - 1,600,000 
Apple 28.05 44.64 40.03 377,996,537 4,174,992 4,252,727 1,400,006 - - 2,800,000 - - 52,721 
Bank of America 0.01 0.25 0.94 8,087,181 8,321,300 13,139,357 1,454,167 - 11,143,643 - - 44,796 497,751 
Casey's 2.89 3.07 2.24 1,219,143 2,365,258 1,195,591 880,000 - - - - 278,745 36,846 
Caterpillar 8.48 5.75 3.01 16,902,023 22,374,744 14,989,569 1,600,008 - - 7,966,091 2,241,766 2,964,405 217,299 
CBS 1.97 2.45 3.09 69,900,677 62,157,026 66,932,581 2,086,539 28,500,000 26,499,925 5,845,000 - 1,343,336 1,230,859 
Cisco 1.17 1.5 1.87 12,886,125 11,687,666 21,049,501 1,100,000 - 15,237,652 - 4,700,080 - 11,769 
Citigroup Inc 3.71 2.53 4.27 10,658,652 12,377,508 17,558,119 1,500,000 5,200,000 7,915,912 - 2,923,069 3,838 15,300 
Coca Cola 1.88 2 1.94 29,115,573 30,460,186 20,380,660 1,600,000 - 6,399,988 7,113,946 2,200,000 2,204,814 861,912 
Deere & Co 6.71 7.72 9.18 18,802,364 19,031,943 19,148,372 1,435,644 - 6,241,025 3,058,773 6,705,518 1,187,345 520,067 
DuPont 3.82 2.94 5.22 15,926,631 15,662,717 14,152,638 1,435,000 - 6,740,550 2,700,001 2,014,000 864,679 398,408 
Emerson Electric 3.27 2.67 2.76 12,786,600 10,360,122 25,318,952 1,300,000 2,000,000 21,556,450 - - - 462,502 
Exelon Corporation 3.72 1.42 2 5,562,144 10,201,250 17,191,698 1,191,539 - 12,606,074 1,565,250 - 1,584,841 243,994 
Exxon Mobil 8.43 9.7 7.37 34,920,506 40,266,501 28,138,329 2,717,000 3,670,000 21,254,625 0 0 0 496,704 
Google 38.82 32.81 30.17 1 1 1 1 - - - - - - 
HCA Holdings 4.97 3.49 3.37 5,738,346 46,359,246 16,527,665 1,339,973  10,771,475  3,292,380 1,040,355 23,482 
J P Morgan Chase 4.48 5.2 4.35 23,105,415 18,717,013 11,791,833 1,500,000 - 10,000,000 - - - 291,833 
Johnson & Johnson 3.54 3.94 4.92 6,836,860 10,977,109 16,910,960 1,453,846 - 5,988,975 2,669,999 4,867,361 1,739,000 191,779 
Microsoft 2.73 2.02 2.61 1,376,915 1,318,128 1,261,218 697,500 550,000 - - - - 13,718 
Miller Energy 
Resources -0.48 -0.6 -0.48 2,766,484 1,029,245 1,298,750 742,212  544,000    12,538 
Oracle 1.67 1.96 2.26 77,559,820 96,160,696 78,440,657 1 1,126 76.893.600 1.165,502 -1.165.502  1.545.930 
Proctor & Gamble 3.93 3.66 3.86 16,188,037 15,198,597 17,964,670 1,817,391 4,945,600 6,446,532 4,235,006   520,141 
Southern Company 2.55 2.67 1.87 9,754,242 13,035,348 8,438,291 1,152,289  3,128,625 2,085,747 1,199,307 805,738 66,485 
United Parcel 
Service 3.84 0.83 4.61 13,053,098 12,147,349 10,335,665 1,079,913  8,272,663 475,277 465,877  41,935 
Walgreens 2.94 2.42 2.56 13,654,636 12,041,058 12,116,245 1,333,333  6,836,271 2,724,490 2,047,499 21,895 691,148 





Company Name Apple Casey's Caterpillar Coca Cola Exxon Mobil Google HCA Holdings J P Morgan Chase 
Southern 
Company 
2012 EPS 44.64  3.07  5.75  2.00  9.70  32.81  3.49  5.20  2.67  
2013 EPS 40.03  2.24  3.01  1.94  7.37  30.17  3.37  4.35  1.87  
Increase (Decrease) (4.61) (0.83) (2.74) (0.06) (2.33) (2.64) (0.12) (0.85) (0.80) 
          
2012 Total  CEO 
Compensation       4,174,992        2,365,258             22,374,744        30,460,186        40,266,501                      1        46,359,246       18,717,013          13,035,348  
2013 Total CEO 
Compensation       4,252,727        1,195,591             14,989,569        20,380,660        28,138,329                      1        16,527,665       11,791,833           8,438,291  
Increase (Decrease) 77,735  (1,169,667) (7,385,175) (10,079,526) (12,128,172) 0  (29,831,581) (6,925,180) (4,597,057) 













Name Cisco Coca Cola Deere & Co 
Exelon 
Corporation 













2012 EPS 1.50  2.00  7.72  1.42  5.20  3.94  1.96  3.66  2.67  0.83  2.42  3.17  
2013 EPS 1.87  1.94  9.18  2.00  4.35  4.92  2.26  3.86  1.87  4.61  2.56  3.42  
Increase 
(Decrease) 0.37  (0.06) 1.46  0.58  (0.85) 0.98  0.30  0.20  (0.80) 3.78  0.14  0.25  
Increase 
(Decrease) 25% -3% 19% 41% -16% 25% 15% 5% -30% 455% 6% 8% 
             
2012 Total  CEO 
Compensation  11,687,666  
  
30,460,186   19,031,943  
              
10,201,250  
            
18,717,013  
              
10,977,109  
  
96,160,696   15,198,597   13,035,348   12,147,349   12,041,058   40,227,848  
2013 Total CEO 
Compensation  21,049,501  
  
20,380,660   19,148,372  
              
17,191,698  
            
11,791,833  
              
16,910,960  
  
78,440,657   17,964,670     8,438,291   10,335,665   12,116,245   34,321,055  
Increase 
(Decrease) 9,361,835  (10,079,526) 116,429  6,990,448  (6,925,180) 5,933,851  (17,720,039) 2,766,073  (4,597,057) (1,811,684) 75,187  (5,906,793) 
Increase 


















(Total) 2013 Salary Bonus Stock Options 
Non-equity 
incentive 
plans Pension Other 
Average 
          
32,729,296  
      
20,666,114  
      
18,914,204  
                           
1,332,654  
   
6,409,532  
      
10,336,245  
      
3,694,130  
            
3,555,912  
      
1,005,985  
         
342,075  
Max 377,996,537 96,160,696 78,440,657 2,717,000 28,500,000 26,499,925 8,478,239 13,570,000 2,964,405 1,230,859 
Min 1 1 1 1 1,126 544,000 0 0 0 11,769 
% of Average 
Total 






















































































































































































































































Percentage of Average Total Compensation
Salary
Bonus
Stock
Options
Non-equity incentive plan
Pension
Other

